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This is the decision on reconsideration of the Railroad Retirement Board
(hereinafter the Board) of a part of its determination dated January 20, 2009 (B.C.D.
09-2) pursuant to 20 CFR 259.1 concerning the status of South Florida Regional
Transportation Authority (SF RTA), Herzog Transit Services, Incorporated (Herzog
Transit), and Trinity Railway Express (Trinity) as employers under the Railroad
Retirement Act (45 U.S.C. § 231 et seq.)(RRA) and the Railroad Unemployment
Insurance Act (45 U.S.C. § 351 et seq.)(RUIA) (the RRA and RUIA are hereinafter
collectively referred to as “the Acts”). INITIAL DECISION
In its decision dated January 20, 2009, the three-member Board determined as
follows: (1) a majority of the Board, Labor Member Speakman dissenting,
determined that SF RTA is not a covered employer under the Acts (Determination
#1); (2) a majority of the Board, Management Member Kever dissenting, determined
that Herzog Transit is a covered employer only with respect to train dispatching
over the rail line of Trinity Railway Express in Texas (Determination #2); and
(3) a majority of the Board, Management Member Kever dissenting, determined that
Trinity itself is not a covered employer to the extent the train dispatching
operations conducted on Trinity’s behalf are reported by Herzog Transit
(Determination #3).
On April 17, 2009, Herzog Transit, Dallas Area Rapid Transit (“DART”), and
Fort Worth Transportation Authority (“The T”) (collectively “Petitioners”) filed
with the Secretary to the Board a Joint Petition for Reconsideration of Board
Coverage Determination (“B.C.D.”) 09-02 pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 259.3(a). In its
joint petition, Petitioners requested the Board to reconsider and reverse
determination #3 in B.C.D. 09-02 and find that Herzog Transit dispatchers
providing those services to Trinity are not covered under the Acts without
disturbing determination #2 that Trinity itself is not covered. Additionally,
Petitioners requested a stay of any applicable requirements to report service
and compensation pending the Board’s decision in the Joint Petition for
Reconsideration of B.C.D. 09-02. For the reasons explained below, on
reconsideration the majority of the Board, Management Member Kever dissenting,
affirms and adopts its initial decision dated January 20, 2009, with respect to
determinations #2 and #3 with the following additional comments. The Board does
not disturb or reconsider determination #1.
DISCUSSION
Initially, it should be noted that Petitioners, in their joint petition for
reconsideration, do not raise any new issues which were not previously
adjudicated by the three-member Board in its January 20, 2009 initial decision.
However, in their joint petition for reconsideration Herzog Transit, DART, and
the T specifically make the following arguments: (1) Rather than applying the
Railroad Ventures test, the Board should have determined the status of the
Herzog Transit dispatchers in accordance with 45 U.S.C. §231(b)(1)(i) and prior
Board decisions; (2) The Herzog Transit dispatchers are not subject to the
continuing authority or control of a covered rail carrier under 45 U.S.C.
§231(b)(1)(i)(A); (3) The Herzog Transit dispatchers are employed by an
independent contractor engaged in an independent trade or business and
therefore, the “integration” tests under 45 U.S.C. §231(b)(1)(i)(B) and (C) do
not apply; and, (4) The Board’s decision would have unintended adverse
consequences.
Essentially, three of the four arguments made in the Petition for
Reconsideration maintain that the Board should have decided this case (i.e.,
Determinations #2 and #3) by using an analysis of whether or not the service
performed constituted employee service for a rail carrier covered by the Acts
administered by the Board. The majority of the Board, Management Member Kever
dissenting, concludes on reconsideration that the initial decision correctly
chose to analyze this case as a determination of employer status – i.e.,
directly addressing the issue of whether the companies involved are employers as
defined in the Railroad Retirement and Railroad Unemployment Insurance Acts.
The Board has both policy-making and quasi-judicial functions. In its
policy-making role, the Board establishes and promulgates rules and regulations
to resolve matters arising under the Acts it is charged with administering. In
its quasi-judicial role, the Board decides controversies of fact and law in
accordance with the Acts and the Board’s regulations. The Board is authorized by
section 7 of the RRA to establish and promulgate rules and regulations. See 45
U.S.C. § 231f(b)(5). Specifically, section 7(b)(5) of the RRA states as follows:
“The Board shall establish and promulgate rules and regulations to provide
for the adjustment of all controversial matters arising in the administration of
this Act. All rules, regulations, or decisions of the Board shall require the
approval of at least two members, and they shall be entered upon the records of
the Board, which shall be a public record.”
Accordingly, the Board is authorized to create and enforce the rules and
regulations necessary to implement and enforce the Acts, with the full force of
a law. Through proposed rulemaking and the promulgation of regulations the Board
issues agency statements of general or practical applicability and future effect
designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy or describe the
organization, procedure, or practice requirements of the agency. Additionally,
under section 7 of the RRA, the Board is responsible for regulating future
conduct of either groups of persons or a single person. Based on this premise, a
decision regarding a company’s status as a covered employer under the Acts must
be made based on the law, and not on the equities, as was clearly set forth in
the Hearing Examiner’s report.
Petitioners argue that that Board was incorrect in applying the Railroad
Ventures test, but rather should have determined the status of the Herzog
Transit dispatchers in accordance with 45 U.S.C. § 231(b)(1)(i) and prior Board
decisions, specifically citing Kelm v. Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis and Omaha
Railway Company, 206 F.2d 831 (8th Cir. 1953). The Board’s initial decision did
not apply the Kelm decision to Trinity’s contract with Herzog Transit because
the majority determined that the question in this case was not the service
performed by the employees, but rather concerned the activity conducted by their
employer, Herzog Transit, on behalf of Trinity. The initial Board decision
determined the specific issue to be not whether individuals on the payroll of
the contractor are statutory employees of a railroad under RRA sections 1(b)(1)
and 1(d)(1) and RUIA sections 1(d) and 1(e), but rather was whether the
contractor itself is a rail carrier employer under RRA section 1(a)(1) and RUIA
section 1(a).
On reconsideration, the majority of the Board, Management Member Kever
dissenting, concludes that the initial decision correctly viewed the nature of
the activity conducted by Herzog as determinative of the type of analysis the
Board used in reaching the initial decision as well as the holding of that
decision. Dispatching is essential to operation of a railroad. A dispatcher
controls train movement. No train can move until a dispatcher gives it
permission to move. In addition to the reasoning set forth in the initial
decision, the majority notes on reconsideration that as part of the mission of
the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) to ensure safe train operation, the
FRA regulates the number of hours that a dispatching employee may work pursuant
to authority set out in the hours of service laws. (See 49 U.S.C. § 21101 et
seq.). The definition section of the law defines “dispatching service employee”
to mean:
. . . an operator, train dispatcher, or other train employee who by the use
of an electrical or mechanical device dispatches, reports, transmits, receives,
or delivers orders related to or affecting train movement. 49 U.S.C. § 21101(2).
Regulations issued by the FRA emphasize the control factor present in the job
of a dispatcher. More specifically, section 241.5 of those regulations defines
the word dispatch in pertinent part to mean:
(1) To perform a function that would be classified as a duty of a
“dispatching service employee,” as that term is defined by the hours of service
laws at 49 U.S.C. 21101(2), if the function were to be performed in the United
States. For example, to dispatch means, by the use of an electrical or
mechanical device –
(i) To control the movement of a train or other on-track
equipment by the issuance of a written or verbal authority or permission
affecting a railroad operation, or by establishing a route through the use of a
railroad signal or train control system but not merely by aligning or realigning
a switch; or
(ii) To control the occupancy of a track by a roadway worker or
stationary on-track equipment, or both . . . (49 CFR 241.5)
It is by virtue of the control that a dispatcher exerts over train movement
that the dispatcher operates the train. Train dispatching includes routing and
tracking train progress, and coordinating the movement of one train with others.
Rail safety depends upon many other factors, such as proper track and signal
maintenance, and even the purchase of proper equipment. These activities,
however necessary though, impact on train operation indirectly and may be
required to be performed while trains are not running (e.g., removal and
replacement of track). In contrast, dispatching concerns directing the movement
of trains and engines over the railroad through the use of clearances, train
orders, manipulation of signals, switches, etc. It should be noted that railroad
dispatchers shoulder more responsibilities today than ever due to changes in
technology, operating practices and the economy. As such, dispatching is as
inextricable a part of the actual motion of trains as is the operation of a
train’s locomotive controls by the engineer. Further, until properly dispatched,
the engineer cannot begin movement of the train.
Dispatchers control the movement of freight or passengers over rail lines.
Herzog does not, itself, operate the trains, but it does direct engineers in the
movement of trains. Without an order from a dispatcher, a train does not move
and cannot deliver its freight or passengers. What we are talking about here is
a crucial component of the movement of freight or passengers from point A to
point B. In other words, a railroad cannot fulfill its obligation to provide
rail service without dispatching services.
The majority of the Board also notes on reconsideration that under common
law, a common carrier is the insurer of the goods it contracts to deliver. It
contracts to safely transport goods as a part of its common carrier obligation
to the shipper. Moreover, the Interstate Commerce Act imposes liability on
carriers for the goods they transport. Dispatching service is an indispensable
component of carrier service and must be delivered as a part of carrier service.
Similar to the situation where a carrier contracts with another entity to
operate its trains, which results in the Board finding the contractor to be an
employer, a contractor that provides the essential operating service of
dispatching for an employer may be found to be an employer under the RRA and
RUIA. In BCD 02-12, the Board held that a commuter authority that provided
dispatching services for the Union Pacific, Amtrak, and Burlington Northern
Santa Fe was a covered employer with respect to the “carrier services”, i.e.
dispatching, that it provided to the Union Pacific, Amtrak, and BNSF. In BCD
03-38, the Board found that a company that provided temporary operating
personnel, including engineers, conductors, trainmen, and dispatchers, to a rail
carrier employer was itself a rail carrier employer. In reaching its decision in
BCD 03-38, the Board cited an earlier decision in BCD 03-23 that had concluded
that an entity that contracts to provide rail operations on behalf of another is
an employer.
The majority of the Board finds on reconsideration that dispatching services
are critical to the performance of a carrier’s obligation to provide rail
service. Where, as in this case, the train dispatching includes trains that
operate interstate, the entity dispatching trains operates as a rail carrier
within the meaning of the definition of an employer under the Railroad
Retirement and Railroad Unemployment Insurance Acts.
CONCLUSION
In summary, the majority of the Board finds on reconsideration that Trinity’s
rail line is used in interstate freight rail service. If Trinity conducted all
aspects of this freight service, it would be a covered employer; if Trinity
conducted none of the freight service and merely held ownership of the rail
line, Trinity would not be a covered employer. The facts are that rather than
contracting all aspects of the freight service together, Trinity split the
leased freight activity into two parts: operation of freight locomotives is
leased to four rail carriers, while dispatching of those locomotives and their
trains is contracted to Herzog Transit. Under Railroad Ventures removing this
aspect of rail carrier operation from the covered freight rail carriers cannot
remove that portion of the operation from coverage. The majority of the Board,
Management Member Kever dissenting, finds on reconsideration that Herzog Transit
is a rail carrier employer under the RRA and RUIA as lessee of the train
dispatching operation over the Trinity rail line. Because Herzog Transit’s
principal business is operation of intrastate passenger rail service, however,
only the dispatching unit under the contract with Trinity is the enterprise
which is considered to be the employer under the regulations of the Board. 20
CFR § 202.3(a).
Petitioners argue that the Board’s decision would have unintended adverse
consequences for other similarly-situated entities. However, the Board makes
decisions concerning a company’s status as a covered employer under the Acts
based on the particular set of facts before it. In other words, the outcome of
each coverage decision is determined by the unique facts relevant to the company
being considered. Moreover, the means by which the Board has chosen to rule on
this issue, i.e., an adjudication, limits application of the ruling to this
particular case. While the interpretation of law in this decision may
certainly serve as a precedent for a future case, it does not necessarily decide
the outcome when these principles are applied to a future case. Rather,
the Board would consider the particular facts before deciding a future case
involving the same or a similar issue. Accordingly, this argument set forth by
Petitioners is without merit.
Last, contained in this request for reconsideration dated April 15, 2009, and
again renewed in a letter dated April 22, 2009 to the Secretary to the Board,
counsel for Petitioners requested a stay of any applicable requirements to
report service and compensation pending the Board’s decision in the Joint
Petition for Reconsideration of B.C.D. 09-02. The Board granted the requested
stay in a letter dated July 28, 2009. That stay will cease to be effective on
the date that this decision is issued.
Based on the above stated reasons, the majority of the Board, Management
Member Kever dissenting, affirms and adopts on reconsideration its initial
decision of January 20, 2009, and concludes that Herzog Transit is a covered
employer only with respect to train dispatching over the rail line of Trinity
Railway Express in Texas and that Trinity itself is not a covered employer to
the extent the train dispatching operations conducted on Trinity’s behalf is
reported by Herzog Transit.
The Board notes that Herzog Transit began conducting the train dispatching
operation effective January 1, 2001. When evidence is that a company met the
definition of a covered railroad employer some years prior to the date of the
Board’s decision, service is creditable only as permitted by section 9 of the
RRA and section 211.16 of the Board’s regulations. Section 9 generally states
that returns of service and compensation are conclusive four years after the
date the return is required to be filed. Regulations of the Board require a
return to be filed by the last day of February of the year following the year
for which service is reported. 20 CFR 209.8. At the time the Board issued its
initial decision on January 20, 2009, the 4 year limitation period under RRA
section 9 had not run for service performed in calendar 2004. Accordingly, on
reconsideration the majority of the Board orders that Herzog Transit file
returns of service with respect to dispatching service employees beginning
January 1, 2004.
The petition for reconsideration is denied.
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Original signed by: |
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Michael S. Schwartz |
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V.M. Speakman, Jr. |
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Jerome F. Kever (Dissenting
opinion attached) |
JEROME F. KEVER
MANAGEMENT MEMBER
DISSENT
Trinity Railway Express – Dispatching
Herzog Transit
Services, Inc.
Docket Item: 09-CO-0019
I dissent from the portion of the majority’s decision that affirms the
Board’s initial determination finding dispatchers working for Herzog Transit
Services to be covered under the Railroad Retirement Act and the Railroad
Unemployment Insurance Act.
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Original signed by: |
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Jerome F. Kever
Management Member |
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Date 10/14/09 |
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